bat365在线官网登录企业与组织研究中心 组织经济学Seminar   总第71期 【OE201603】  
组织经济学（Organizational Economics）Seminar由bat365在线官网登录企业与组织研究中心（CFOS）主办。CFOS的宗旨是，利用现代经济学方法研究中国的企业、政府、市场和非营利组织的重大问题，推动企业理论、契约理论和制度经济学的研究与教学。关注CFOS，请访问http://CFOS.ruc.edu.cn。
 
时间：2016年3月30日（周三）12：00－13：30
地点：明德主楼734会议室
主讲：陈婷
主题：Do Land Revenue Windfalls Create A Political Resource Curse? Evidence from China（土地财政是否创造了政治的资源诅咒：来自中国的证据）
摘要：By analyzing a panel on the political turnovers of 4,390 county leaders in China during 1999–2008, we find that the revenue windfalls accrued to these officials from land sales have both undermined the effectiveness of the promotion system for government officials and fueled corruption. Instead of rewarding efforts made to boost GDP growth, promotion is positively correlated with signaling efforts, with those politically connected to their superiors and those beyond the prime age for promotion being the primary beneficiaries. Likewise, land revenue windfalls have led to increases in the size of bureaucracy and administrative expenditure—corruption in short.
 
演讲者简介：Chen Ting is currently postdoctoral fellow at the Social Science Division in the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, from where she completed her doctoral defense in 2015 fall. Her research interests lie in political economy, economic history and development economics. In her dissertation, she has been conducting studies over a broad range of research topics concerning about local official’s turnover, political connection and corruption. Recently, with coauthors, she started a new project examining the long-term persistence of Imperial Exam (Keju) on contemporary human capital accumulation.
 
 
bat365在线官网登录 人大企业与组织研究中心 国发院新政治经济学研究中心 人大微观数据与实证方法研究中心 2016年3月28日