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组织经济学Seminar

【201310】

组织经济学（Organizational Economics）Seminar由bat365在线官网登录企业与组织研究中心（CFOS）主办。CFOS的宗旨是，利用现代经济学方法研究中国的企业、政府、市场和非营利组织的重大问题，推动企业理论、契约理论和制度经济学的研究与教学。关注CFOS，请访问http://CFOS.ruc.edu.cn。

时间：2013年9月18日（周三）12：00－13：30

地点：明德主楼729会议室

主讲：孟大文

主题：存在两个代理人时的防范合谋机制设计/Two-Agent Collusion-Proof Mechanism Design

摘要：This paper studies the cost requirement for two-agent collusion-proof mechanism design. Unlike the existing results for general environments with three or more agents, it is shown that collusive behavior cannot be prevented freely in two-agent nonlinear pricing environments with correlated. Reporting manipulation calls for distortions away from the first-best efficiency, and arbitrage calls for further distortion. Moreover, we show that the distortionary patterns are quite different for positive and negative correlations. The second-best outcome is attainable as correlation goes to zero from left, while the limit of collusion-proof efficiency is strictly lower than the second-best level as correlation goes to zero from right. Allowing arbitrage therefore breaks the continuity between correlated and uncorrelated types.

演讲者简介：孟大文，经济学博士，上海财经大学高等研究院副研究员。研究方向为博弈论、契约理论、机制设计理论。曾在Games and Economic Behavior、Lecture Note in Computer Science、《经济学季刊》等国内外刊物发表论文数篇。主持国家自然科学基金项目、教育部人文社科项目等数项课题。

项目协调人：聂辉华

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2013年9月15日