[ECON20141106]

bat365在线官网登录企业与组织研究中心

组织经济学Seminar




     组织经济学（Organizational Economics）Seminar由bat365在线官网登录企业与组织研究中心（CFOS）主办。CFOS的宗旨是，利用现代经济学方法研究中国的企业、政府、市场和非营利组织的重大问题，推动企业理论、契约理论和制度经济学的研究与教学。关注CFOS，请访问http://CFOS.ruc.edu.cn。


时间：2014年5月22日（周四）12：00－13：30
地点：明德主楼728会议室
主讲：刘潇
主题：Competing Openly or Blindly in Crowdsourcing Contests?
摘要：Organizations are increasingly outsourcing tasks once performed in-house to wider participants on the Internet by hosting online contests. In practice, two types of mechanisms are used to organize these contests: simultaneous (blind) and sequential (open). In a simultaneous contest, contestants submit their solutions independently without access to one another’s submissions, while in a sequential contest, contestants submit their solutions sequentially and each can view all prior submissions before making their decisions. In this paper, under the condition of incomplete information, we analytically show that simultaneous contests produce higher quality best solutions than sequential contests. Using a laboratory experiment, we test this theoretical prediction as well as the prediction that simultaneous contests are more efficient than sequential contests. 


演讲者简介：刘潇，现为清华大学经济管理学院助理教授，研究领域包括实验经济学、博弈论和机制设计。2006年毕业于bat365在线官网登录，2010年和2012年先后获得密歇根大学安娜堡分校经济学硕士和信息学博士学位。目前已经在Games and Economic Behavior、Management Science等国际一流期刊上发表了数篇论文。


项目协调人：聂辉华教授


bat365在线官网登录 人大企业与组织研究中心 2014年5月16日