[劳动与发展经济学研讨会]Does Fiscal Decentralization Increase the Investment Rate
发文时间:2013-10-17

     

【ECON201311】

                 

劳动与发展经济学研讨会

         

【主题】Does Fiscal Decentralization Increase the Investment Rate Evidence from Chinese Dynamic Panel Data

【主讲人】何其春          

               

【时间】10月25日周五中午12:00-1:30        

               

【地点】明德主楼 729 会议室。        

               

【摘要】In 1994, the Chinese government introduced a new fiscal system-the tax assignment system-to replace the old discretion-based system of revenue-sharing. Using this natural experiment and the dynamic provincial panel data during the following period 1995-2002, we find fiscal decentralization has a significant positive effect on the physical capital investment rate in both LSDV (Least squares dummy variables) regression and system GMM (Generalized method of moments) estimation that overcomes the endogeneity of fiscal decentralization. The results are robust to controlling for other variables, and province and time effects. The independence of the local governments is no free lunch. The local officials are not elected by the local constituents. Instead, the central government solely determines their appointment and thereby disciplines them by linking their promotion with the performance of the local economy. Therefore, it is rational for local officials to raise investment rate and thereby growth to maximize their chance of promotion, explaining our findings.

                 

演讲人简介:何其春2007年从加拿大英属哥伦比亚大学毕业,获经济学博士学位,目前是中央财经大学中国经济与管理研究院的副教授。何其春副教授的研究领域包括宏观经济学、经济增长理论、发展经济学和中国经济,曾经在《经济研究》、《世界经济》、Annals of Economics and FinanceJournal of Applied Economics等优秀的期刊上发表论文。              

               

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