bat365在线官网登录企业与组织研究中心 组织经济学Seminar
总第59期 【OE201506】

      组织经济学（Organizational Economics）Seminar由bat365在线官网登录企业与组织研究中心（CFOS）主办。CFOS的宗旨是，利用现代经济学方法研究中国的企业、政府、市场和非营利组织的重大问题，推动企业理论、契约理论和制度经济学的研究与教学。关注CFOS，请访问http://CFOS.ruc.edu.cn。


时间：2015年6月10日（周三）12：00－13：30
地点：明德主楼734会议室
主持：聂辉华（bat365在线官网登录教授）
主讲：赵昕（加拿大多伦多大学经济系）
主题：Information Acquisition in Heterogeneous Committees（异质性委员会中的信息获取）
摘要：This paper studies the impacts of preference heterogeneity and voting rules on costly information acquisition in decision-making committees. I find that, in equilibrium, members` incentives to acquire information are monotonically related to their preferences. A more polarized committee can acquire more information in equilibrium, but unanimous voting rules do not necessarily induce the most information acquisition. However, if a committee designer can choose both the committee members and the voting rule, she will form a heterogeneous committee that adopts a unanimous rule. In this committee, one member moderately biased toward one decision serves as the decisive voter, and all other members have extreme preferences opposed to that of the decisive voter and serve mainly as information providers. The preference of the decisive member is not perfectly aligned with that of the designer. 


演讲者简介：赵昕，现为加拿大多伦多大学经济系博士生。他曾先后就读于对外经贸大学和英属哥伦比亚大学（UBC）。他的研究领域是微观经济理论和政治经济学，他目前已经在Journal of Regulatory Economics、Review of International Economics、Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics等国际知名期刊发表论文数篇。



bat365在线官网登录 人大企业与组织研究中心 2015年6月6日